Article 1267 of Obligations and Contracts

 by Nil Jay Perolina

CHAPTER 4 – EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS

Art. 1267. When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part. (n)

What is Article 1267 all about?

It is about the effect of difficulty of performance.

What is the meaning of Article 1267?

It means that when the performance of the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of both parties, the court is authorized to release the obligor in whole or in part. It would be doing violence to the intention of the parties to hold the obligor still responsible. There is an element of the unforeseen or fortuitous event in the situation covered by Article 1267.

What is the reason behind Article 1267?

The parties to the contract must be presumed to have assumed the risk of unfavorable developments. It is therefore only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that equity demands assistance for the debtor. 

What is effect of difficulty of performance?

Difficulty of service or performance authorizes the release of the obligor but does not authorize the courts to remake, modify or revise the contract stipulated with the force of law, so as to substitute its own terms for those covenanted by the parties themselves.

What is the doctrine of unforeseen events?

This is said to be based on the discredited theory of rebus sic stantibus  in public international law; under this theory, the parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions, and once these conditions cease to exist the contract also ceases to exist.

What are the requirements for doctrine of unforeseen event to apply in an obligation?

It requires that:

• Prestation has become so difficult to render;

• Service has become manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.

Illustrations/Examples

Illustration 1:

X agreed to construct a road near a mountain. A very strong typhoon caused an avalanche making the construction of the road dangerous to human lives. (Note: The obligation is not impossible of performance.)

In this case, X may be released, in whole or in part, from his obligation to continue with the construction. (see Labayen vs. Talisay Silay Milling Co., 52 Phil. 440 [1928]

Illustration 2:

If A contracted B to construct deep well at P 50 000.00 but for some reasons A was not satisfied with the water source of the deep well. B explained that he cannot extract deeper than 100 feet anymore. Since the contracted price was only P 50 000.00 it was not enough to cover all expenses for reconstruction, B is released from the obligation.

Case Digest from Original Case

Citation:

Occena vs Jabson

Case Docket:

G.R. No. L-44349

Date:

October 29, 1976

Petitioners:

JESUS V. OCCEÑA and EFIGENIA C. OCCEÑA

Respondents:

HON. RAMON V. JABSON, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVI; COURT OF APPEALS and TROPICAL HOMES, INC.

Petitioner's Counsel:

Occeña Law Office

Respondent's Counsel:

Serrano, Diokno & Serrano

Ponente:

TEEHANKEE, J.

FACTS:

On February 25, 1975 private respondent Tropical Homes, Inc. filed a complaint for modification of the terms and conditions of its subdivision contract with petitioners (landowners of a 55,330 square meter parcel of land in Davao City), making the following allegations:

"That due to the increase in price of oil and its derivatives and the concomitant worldwide spiraling of prices, which are not within the control of plaintiff, of all commodities including basis raw materials required for such development work, the cost of development has risen to levels which are unanticipated, unimagined and not within the remotest contemplation of the parties at the time said agreement was entered into and to such a degree that the conditions and factors which formed the original basis of said contract, Annex ‘A’, have been totally changed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Courts are authorized to modify or revise contracts between parties.

RULING:

The resolution of respondent appellate court is reversed and the petition for certiorari is granted and private respondent’s complaint in the lower court is ordered dismissed for failure to state a sufficient cause of action. With costs in all instances against private Respondent.

The Civil Code authorizes the release of an obligor when the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties but does not authorize the courts to modify or revise the subdivision contract between the parties or fix a different sharing ratio from that contractually stipulated with the force of law between the parties. Private respondent’s complaint for modification of the contract manifestly has no basis in law and must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

_________________________________________________________

Thank you very much! :)

Article 1241 & 1242 of Obligations and Contracts

by Nil Jay Perolina

CHAPTER 4 – EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS

Art. 1241.     

Payment to a person who is incapacitated to administer his property shall be valid if he has kept the thing delivered, or insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him.

Payment made to a third person shall also be valid insofar as it has redounded to the benefit of the creditor. 

Such benefit to the creditor need not be proved in the following cases:

1. If after the payment, the third person acquires the creditor's rights;

2. If the creditor ratifies the payment to the third person;

3. If by the creditor's conduct, the debtor has been led to believe that the third person had authority to receive the payment. (1163a)

What is Article 1241 all about?

It is about the effect of payment to an incapacitated person and third person.

What is the meaning of Article 1241?

Person to whom payment is made must have the capacity and authority to receive it. Payment to anyone not the creditor or his successor or authorized representative is not effective payment. For incapacitated persons, guardians should handle their affairs. When the creditor is incapacitated to receive payment, this must be made to his legal representative if there is one. If there be none, then the debtor may relieve himself of responsibility by delivering the thing to the court in consignation, by virtue of Article 1256. 

What is the reason behind Article 1241?

If paying to such incapacitated and third persons has been allowed, it can be easily taken advantage of. By operation of law, as a general rule such incapacitated and third persons have no capacity and authority to receive payment.

1ST PARAGRAPH DISCUSSION:

Payment to a person who is incapacitated to administer his property shall be valid if he has kept the thing delivered, or insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him.

What is the effect of payment to incapacitated persons?

As a  general rule, in order that payment may be valid, the person to whom it is made must have the capacity to receive it. Accordingly, when the payment was made to a person who has no capacity to act or incapacitated to manage his property, the payment is not valid.

Since payment is not valid, the debtor may be made to pay again by the incapacitated himself when he attains capacity, or his legal representative during such incapacity

What is the debtor's option if the creditor is incapacitated to receive payment?

For incapacitated persons, guardians should handle their affairs. When the creditor is incapacitated to receive payment, this must be made to his legal representative if there is one. If there be none, then the debtor may relieve himself of responsibility by delivering the thing to the court in consignation, by virtue of Article 1256.

When are payments to incapacitated persons valid?

It is only valid if the incapacitated person kept the thing delivered; or insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him.

Illustration/ Example:

D obtained a loan of P10,000 from C who was in his right mind at the time he granted the loan. On due date, D paid his obligation of P10,000 to C who had since become insane. C lost P4,000 of the amount he received and spent P6,000 for his food and other necessary expenses. Was the obligation extinguished?

By the rationale of this article, the obligation is extinguished up to P6,000 only. Payment of an obligation to an incapacitated person shall be valid when the person has kept the thing delivered and only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him. Php 4,000 shall still be payable to legal representative or guardian provided that creditor has not regain his capacity yet

2ND PARAGRAPH DISCUSSION:

Payment made to a third person shall also be valid insofar as it has redounded to the benefit of the creditor. Such benefit to the creditor need not be proved in the following cases:

(1) If after the payment, the third person acquires the creditor’s rights;

(2) If the creditor ratifies the payment to the third person;

(3) If by the creditor’s conduct, the debtor has been led to believe that the third person had authority to receive the payment. (1163a)

What is the effect of payment made to third persons?

In effect, debtor is not released from liability by a payment to one who is not the creditor nor one authorized to receive the payment, even if the debtor believed in good faith that he is the creditor, except to the extent that the payment extends to the benefit of the creditor.

What are the instances which make payment to third persons valid under Article 1241?

Under Article 1241, benefit to the creditor for payment made by the debtor to a third person must be proven, except:

1. When the third person acquires the creditor’s rights (Legal subrogation); 

2. When the creditor ratifies payment to the originally unauthorized third person (ratification); or

3. When the debtor has been led to believe that the third person has authority to receive the payment. (Estoppel) 

Illustrations/Examples:

Illustration 1:

In case of car insurances, when an insured driver's car is totaled through the fault of another driver, the insurance company reimburses the covered driver under the terms of the policy and then pursues legal action against the driver at fault. This is legal subrogation.

Illustration 2:

In a simple obligation wherein debtor is to pay creditor but debtor on the other hand made payment to third person X who has no authority to act as creditor’s agent and collect payment, as a general rule such payment by the debtor is invalid. But by virtue of this provision, if creditor has ratified such payment to third person X be valid then debtor’s obligation will be extinguished. This is ratification.

Illustration 3:

In our example earlier, debtor is to pay creditor but this time creditor on the other hand assigned third person X as agent to collect payment to debtor and then payment is made to X, debtor’s obligation will be extinguished but in this case creditor is asserting a claim or right that contradicts what he said before wherein he said that he didn’t assigned X, in effect debtor has been led to believe that the third person has authority to receive the payment then obligation of debtor is extinguished. This is estoppel.

What are the other instances which make payment to third persons valid aside from instances under Article 1241? 

In the following cases, in addition to those enumerated by this article, payment to a third person releases the debtor:

1. When, without notice of the assignment of the credit, he pays to the original creditor (Article 1626)

2. When in good faith he pays to one in possession of the credit (Article 1242)

Illustration/Example:

Debtor owes Creditor P10,000. Creditor assigns his credit right (right to collect) to A for a consideration with notice to debtor. Parties to the obligation are the original creditor which is the assignor, A which is the assignee and the Debtor. The effect of the assignment of credit is that debtor will have to make his payment to A (assignee) and no longer to the original creditor (assignor). This is the situation of assignment of credit.

Art. 1242. Payment made in good faith to any person in possession of the credit shall release the debtor. (1164)

What is article 1242 all about?

It is about the effect of payment to person in possession of credit.

What is the meaning of Article 1242?

It must be observed that the “possession” referred in the provision is possession of the credit itself and not merely of the document or instrument evidencing the credit. Hence, mere possession of the instrument (unless transferable by delivery) does not entitle the holder to payment nor does payment release the debtor. Furthermore, the payer must act in good faith, that is, in the honest belief that he is making a valid payment and that the payee is the owner of the credit. Good faith, however, is presumed.

What is the reason behind Article 1242?

A person in possession of credit is presumed to own it. Debtor who pays such person in good faith shall be released from debt. If the creditor allows another person to possess the credit, the risk and burden shifts to him, provided the debtor is in good faith

What is the effect of payment to a person in possession of credit?

Payment to the possessor of the document or title does not necessarily extinguish the credit except when done in good faith. The good faith of the debtor consists in the belief that the party who presents the title of the obligation is the true creditor, or that the person to whom the payment is made is the owner of the credit.

Illustration/Example:

D is indebted to C in the amount of P1,000.00 which indebtedness is evidenced by a promissory note signed by D in favor of C. C lost the promissory note which was later found by X who demanded payment from D.

Payment to X is not valid because X is the possessor merely of the document evidencing the credit and not of the credit itself. If the promissory note is payable to bearer or holder (Negotiable Instruments Law [Act No. 2031], Sec. 9.) the obligation will be extinguished if D pays X in good faith. Similarly, if the promissory note was indorsed by C to X, under a private agreement that X would not collect from D, payment by D in good faith to X will also extinguish the debt. It is immaterial that X acted in bad faith. The right of C will be against X.

Case Digest from the Original Case 

Citation:

Aranas v Tutaan, February 29, 1984

Case Docket:

G.R. No. L-52807

Date:

February 29, 1984

Petitioner:

JOSE ARAÑAS and LUISA QUIJENCIO ARAÑAS

Respondents:

HON. EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, and UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.

Counsel for Petitioner: 

Jose R. Francisco

Counsel for Respondent: 

Reyes, Santayana, Tayao & Picazo Law Office

Ponente:

TEEHANKEE, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Luisa Quijencio as plaintiff (assisted by her spouse co-petitioner Jose Arañas) was the owner of 400 shares of stock of respondent Universal Textile Mills, Inc. (UTEX) as defendant issued "in the names of its co-defendants Gene Manuel and B.R. Castañeda, including the stock dividends that accrued to said shares, and ordering defendant Universal Textile Mills, Inc. to cancel said certificates and issue new ones in the name of said plaintiff Luisa Quijencio Arañas and to deliver to her all dividends appertaining to same, whether in cash or in stocks.

At petitioners’ instance, the lower court issued a writ of execution and a specific order of December 5, 1979 directing UTEX:

"1. To effect the cancellation of the certificates of stock in question in the names of B.R. Castañeda and Gene G. Manuel and the issuance of new ones in the names of the plaintiffs;

"2. To pay the amount of P100,701.45 representing the cash dividends that accrued to the same stocks from 1972 to 1979 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the service of the writ of execution on October 3, 1979 until fully paid."

ISSUE:

Whether the payment of judgment debt to wrong party does not extinguish judgment debtor’s obligation to rightful party.

RULING:

Yes, if UTEX chose to pay the wrong parties, notwithstanding its full knowledge and understanding of the final judgment, that it was liable to pay all dividends after the trial court’s judgment in 1971 to petitioners as the lawfully declared owners of the questioned shares of stock (but which could not be enforced against it pending the outcome of the appeal filed by the co-defendants Castañeda and Manuel in the Court of Appeals), it only had itself to blame therefor. The burden of recovery the supposed payment of the cash dividends made by UTEX to the wrong parties Castañeda and Manuel squarely falls upon itself by its own action and cannot be passed by it to petitioners as innocent parties. It is elementary that payment made by a judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot extinguish the judgment obligation of such debtor to its creditor.

_________________________________________________________

Thank you very much! :)

Article 1214 & 1215 of Obligations and Contracts

by Nil Jay V. Perolina

Chapter 3 - Different Kinds of Obligations

Art. 1214. The debtor may pay any one of the solidary creditors; but if any demand, judicial or extrajudicial, has been made by one of them, payment should be made to him. (1142a)

What is article 1214 about?

It is about effect of demand by a solidary creditor.

What is the meaning of Article 1214?

Any of the solidary creditors may accept full performance of the obligation and such payment when accepted by any of the solidary creditors will extinguish the obligation.

What is the reason behind the article?

The solidary creditors share the same right to demand for the performance of the obligation so such payment when accepted by one of them will extinguish the obligation.

What is the general rule in Article 1214?

The debtor may pay any one of the solidary creditors. 

Illustration/Example

In an obligation wherein D, an obligor, has an obligation to pay the solidary creditors A, B and C of the loan amounting Php 10,000.00, obligor D can pay the solidary creditor A and such payment when accepted by A as a solidary creditors will extinguish the obligation. 

What is the exception on the general rule?

If any demand, judicial or extrajudicial has been made by any of the solidary creditors, payment should be made to him.

Illustration/Example

In our previous example, an obligation wherein D, an obligor, has an obligation to pay the solidary creditors A, B and C of the loan amounting Php 10,000.00 and then B filed a court case, obligor D should pay the solidary creditor B and such payment to B as a solidary creditor will extinguish the obligation. 

What is the effect if the debtor pays to a creditor who did not demand?

The same is deemed a payment made to a wrong person, in so far as the shares of the others in the credit are concerned. In other words, the payment made to any other creditor will not extinguish the obligation except insofar as the payee’s share is concerned. 

What will happen if there are two or more demands made by the other creditors?

In such case wherein two or more demands are made by the other creditors, the first demand must be given priority.

How does the rule apply to a mixed solidarity?

In mixed solidarity, when one creditor makes a demand upon one of the debtors, the latter cannot pay to any other creditor but the one who made the demand. The prohibition, however, does not apply to the other debtors upon whom demand has not been served, and hence they may pay to any creditor who may not be the one who made the demand.

Art. 1215. 

    Novation, compensation, confusion or remission of the debt, made by any of the solidary creditors or with any of the solidary debtors, shall extinguish the obligation, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1219. 

    The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall be liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them. (1143)

What is the article 1215 about?

It is about the liability of solidary creditor in case of novation, compensation, confusion, or remission.

What is the reason behind Article 1215?

Novation, compensation, confusion, and remission are modes or causes of extinguishment of obligations. (Will be discussed further in Art. 1231.) 

In case of any of these modes or causes of extinguishment of obligation it is but logical that the creditor who executed any of these acts should be liable to the others for their corresponding shares considering that such acts are prejudicial to them.

1st paragraph-Novation, compensation, confusion or remission of the debt, made by any of the solidary creditors or with any of the solidary debtors, shall extinguish the obligation, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1219. 

What are the modes of extinguishing obligations?

1. Novation – change of creditors, debtors or the principal condition of the contract; must be clear to release the solidary obligation of the debtors.

Illustration/Example:

B enters into a contract with C for B to paint C’s house for Php 5,000. B then enters into a separate contract with C and D for D to paint C’s house and to discharge his duties to C. The new contract is called a novation.

2. Compensation – when two persons, in their own rights, are creditors and debtors of each other. It is otherwise known as "Offsetting" or in tagalog ‘quits lang’

Illustration/Example:

X owes B in amount of 100. B on the other hand owes X in amount of 20. If both debts are due and payable today. So, X only owes B in amount of 80

3. Confusion – merger of the characters of creditor and debtor in the same person.

Illustrations/Examples:

a. A owes B Php 5,000. B dies and in his will, he makes A his only heir. The debt is extinguished as A is both debtor to the estate and therefore the creditor also, as sole heir.

b. D borrowed money from C. As security, D mortgaged his land. Subsequently, D sold the land to C.

4. Remission – condonation of an obligation.

Illustration/Example:

X only repays a portion of the money he owes to Y. However, Y agrees to accept it as a final settlement of the debt. Y’s act of remission discharges the contract.

2nd paragraph-The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall be liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them. (1143)

What is the meaning of the 2nd paragraph of Article 1214?

The law clearly provides that the creditor who extinguished the obligation shall be liable to the others for the share in the obligations corresponding to them.

Illustration/Example: 

If A, B and C are solidary debtors of D, E and F in the amount of P15,000 and A informs D that he is recommending X to pay the debt provided that A  is released from the obligation, and X and D agreed to the change, there is a novation on the part of A (since there is novation, there is already a mode of extinguishment of obligation). Not only A is released, but also B and C. Now as per of 2nd paragraph of Article 115, solidary creditor D then will be liable to the other solidary creditors E and F.

Case Digest from Original Case

Citation:

Ronquillo v CA, 132 SCRA 247, 1984

Case Docket:

G.R. No. L-55138

Date:

September 28, 1984

Petitioner:

Ernesto V. Ronquillo

Respondents:

Honorable Court of Appeals and Antonio P. So

Ponente:

Cuevas, J.

Counsel for Petitioner:

Gloria A. Fortun 

Counsel for Respondent: 

Roselino Reyes Isler 

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto V. Ronquillo was one of four (4) defendants in Civil Case No. 33958 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now the Regional Trial Court), Branch XV filed by private respondent Antonio P. So, on July 23, 1979, for the collection of the sum of P17,498.98 plus attorney's fees and costs. The other defendants were Offshore Catertrade Inc., Johnny Tan and Pilar Tan. The amount of P117,498.98 sought to be collected represents the value of the checks issued by said defendants in payment for foodstuffs delivered to and received by them. The said checks were dishonored by the drawee bank.

On December 13, 1979, the lower court rendered its Decision that Plaintiff agrees to reduce its total claim to Php 110,000 which will be two (2) sets of Php 55,000 from the original Php 117,000 and that the defendants bind themselves individually and jointly. Both parties also agreed that failure on the part of either party to comply, the innocent party will be entitled to an execution of the decision based on the compromise agreement and the defaulting party agrees and hold themselves to reimburse the innocent party for attorney's fees, execution fees and other fees related with the execution.

Defendants then failed to pay the initial amount on due date which led the plaintiff to file Motion for Execution which was then opposed by the then Petitioner. He then prayed that private respondent be ordered to accept his payment in the amount of P13,750.00 as his pro rata share on the initial payment. On the other hand, the lower court ordered that regardless of whatever the compromise agreement has intended the payment whether jointly or individually, or jointly and severally, the fact is that only P27,500.00 has been paid. There appears to be a non-payment in accordance with the compromise agreement of the amount of P27,500.00 on or before December 24, 1979. The parties are reminded that the payment is condition sine qua non to the lifting of the preliminary attachment and the execution of an affidavit of desistance.

On March 20, 1980, Special Sheriff Eulogio C. Juanson of Rizal, issued a notice of sheriff's sale, for the sale of certain furniture and appliances found in petitioner's residence to satisfy the sum of P82,500.00. The public sale was scheduled for April 2, 1980 at 10:00 a.m. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Order of Execution dated March 17, 1980 which was set for hearing on March 25, 1980, was upon motion of private respondent reset to April 2, 1980 at 8:30 a.m. Realizing the actual threat to property rights poised by the re-setting of the hearing of motion for reconsideration for April 2, 1980 at 8:30 a.m. such that if his motion for reconsideration would be denied he would have no more time to obtain a writ from the appellate court to stop the scheduled public sale of his personal properties at 10:00 a.m. of the same day, April 2, 1980, petitioner filed on March 26, 1980 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the then Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-10573), praying at the same time for the issuance of a restraining order to stop the public sale.

ISSUES:

1. Was the filing of a petition for certiorari before the then Court of Appeals against the Order of Execution issued by the lower court, dated March 17, 1980, proper, despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration of the same questioned Order?

2. What is the nature of the liability of the defendants (including petitioner), was it merely joint, or was it several or solidary?

RULING:

Yes, regarding the first issue raised, suffice it to state that while as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration should precede recourse to certiorari in order to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the error that it may have committed, the said rule is not absolutes and may be dispensed with in instances where the filing of a motion for reconsideration would serve no useful purpose, such as when the motion for reconsideration would raise the same point stated in the motion or where the error is patent for the order is void or where the relief is extremely urgent, as in cases where execution had already been ordered where the issue raised is one purely of law.

On the second issue, the defendants obligated themselves to pay their obligation "individually and jointly".

The term "individually" has the same meaning as "collectively", "separately", "distinctively", respectively or "severally". An agreement to be "individually liable" undoubtedly creates a several obligation, and a "several obligation is one by which one individual binds himself to perform the whole obligation. 

The obligation in the case at bar being described as "individually and jointly", the same is therefore enforceable against one of the numerous obligors.

_________________________________________________________

Thank you very much! :)

Article 1190 of Obligations and Contracts

by Nil Jay V. Perolina

Chapter 3 - Different Kinds of Obligations

Article 1190. 

When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received.    

In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return.

As for the obligations to do and not to do, the provisions of the second paragraph of article 1187 shall be observed as regards the effect of the extinguishment of the obligation. (1123)

What is article 1190 about?

It refers to the fulfillment of a resolutory condition. 

What is the meaning of Article 1190?

Once a resolutory condition is fulfilled, the obligation is extinguished. 

What is the reason behind the article?

When the resolutory condition happened, the obligation is considered as if it did not exist.

What are the types of obligations as to subject matter?

Real Obligation . The obligation to give 

Personal Obligation . The obligation to do or not to do.

1ST PARAGRAPH DISCUSSION

When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received.

What are the types of conditions as to effect?

1. Suspensive – the happening of the condition give rise to the obligation. 

2. Resolutory – the happening of the condition extinguishes the obligation.

What is the effect if the obligation does not exist?

The parties are bound to return or restore whatever they have received from each other which is what we call Reciprocal Restitution/Mutual Restitution

Illustrations/ Examples

Illustration 1

If the obligation states that A shall continue having possession over a particular car from B provided that she will not bet in the lottery and A bets in the lottery, her right to the possession of the car is extinguished. At the same time, the obligation of B to allow the A the possession of the car is extinguished also.

Illustration 2

X binds himself to lend his only car to Y until the latter passes the CPA Board. The obligation to lend is immediately demandable. Y’s right over the car is extinguished upon his passing the CPA board. Y is now obliged to return the car.

Illustration 3

C binds himself to lend his Civil Code codals to D until he finish his Persons and Family Relations Law then the obligation of C to lend D his codals is immediately demandable. But upon finishing the subject, D’s right over the codals is extinguished. D is now obliged to return the car.

2ND PARAGRAPH DISCUSSION

In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return.

What is the meaning of the 2nd paragraph?

This refers to the condition or the state of the thing to be returned which means that in case of loss, deterioration and improvement, Article 1189 shall govern.

What are the types of losses in Civil Law?

A thing is deemed lost:

a. When it perishes; (Physical loss ex. House is burned/reduced to ashes)

b. When it goes out of commerce of man; (legal loss ex. Expropriation, legal thing becomes illegal) or

c. When it disappears in such a manner that its existence is unknown or it cannot be recovered (civil loss ex. Dog missing for sometime, ring drop in sea, property lost thru prescription)

3RD PARAGRAPH DISCUSSION

As for the obligations to do and not to do, the provisions of the second paragraph of article 1187 shall be observed as regards the effect of the extinguishment of the obligation. (1123)

What is the effect of resolutory condition in obligations to do and not to do?

In Art. 1187, Par. 2, it is stated that in obligations to do and not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the retroactive effect of the condition that has been complied with.

Illustration/Example

In Donation Proper Nuptias, if the marriage does not happen, such donation should be returned to the donor. 

Case Digest from Original Case

Citation:               

Ong v. CA, 310 SCRA 1, July 6, 1999

Case Docket:                

G.R. No. 97347  

Date:                     

July 6, 1999

Petitioner:            

JAIME G. ONG

Respondents:       

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MIGUEL K. ROBLES and ALEJANDRO M. ROBLES

Ponente:               

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

As cited in page 169, Article 1191 of Balane book

FACTS:

On May 10, 1983, petitioner Jaime Ong, on the one hand, and respondent spouses Miguel K. Robles and Alejandra Robles, on the other hand, executed an "Agreement of Purchase and Sale" respecting two parcels of land situated at Barrio Puri, San Antonio, Quezon. On May 15, 1983, petitioner Ong took possession of the subject parcels of land together with the piggery, building, ricemill, residential house and other improvements thereon.

Pursuant to the contract they executed, petitioner paid respondent spouses the sum of P103,499.91 by depositing it with the United Coconut Planters Bank. Subsequently, petitioner deposited sums of money with the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI), in accordance with their stipulation that petitioner pay the loan of respondents with BPI.

To answer for his balance of P1,400,000.00 petitioner issued four (4) post-dated Metro Bank checks payable to respondent spouses in the amount of P350,0000.00 each, namely: Check No. 157708 dated June 15, 1983,Check No. 157709 dated September 15, 1983,Check No. 157710 dated December 15, 1983 and Check No. 157711 dated March 15, 1984. When presented for payment, however, the checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds.

Petitioner promised to replace the checks but failed to do so. To make matters worse, out of the P496,500.00 loan of respondent spouses with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, which petitioner, as per agreement, should have paid, petitioner only managed to dole out no more than P393,679.60. When the bank threatened to foreclose the respondent spouses' mortgage, they sold three transformers of the rice mill worth P51,411.00 to pay off their outstanding obligation with said bank, with the knowledge and conformity of petitioner. 

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the contract entered into by the parties may be validly rescinded under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code; and 

(2) Whether the parties had novated their original contract as to the time and manner of payment

RULING:

No, the contract is not rescissible. The non-fulfillment of the condition of full payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. It must be stressed that the breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligor's failure to comply with an obligation.

Failure to pay, in this instance, is not even a breach but merely an event which prevents the vendor's obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force. Hence, the agreement of the parties in the case at bench may be set aside, but not because of a breach on the part of petitioner for failure to complete payment of the purchase price. Rather, his failure to do so brought about a situation which prevented the obligation of respondent spouses to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.

Yes, contrary to petitioner's claim, records show that the parties never even intended to novate their previous agreement. It is true that petitioner paid respondents small sums of money amounting to P48,680.00, in contravention of the manner of payment stipulated in their contract. 

These installments were, however, objected to by respondent spouses, and petitioner replied that these represented the interest of the principal amount which he owed them. Records further show that petitioner agreed to the sale of MERALCO transformers by private respondents to pay for the balance of their subsisting loan with the Bank of Philippine Islands. 

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Thank you very much! :)

Article 1171 & 1172 of Obligations and Contracts

by Nil Jay V. Perolina

Chapter 2 - Nature and Effect of Obligations

Article 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.(1102a)

What is Article 1171 about?

It is about the effect of waiver of fraud in an obligation.

What is the meaning of Article 1171?

If fraud is present in the obligation, the same is immediately demandable. Waiver of future fraud is void.

What is the reason behind this Article?

Fraud is absolutely not encouraged by the law because of its evil effects. 

What is Fraud?

Fraud or Dolo is the deliberate or intentional evasion of the normal fulfilment of an obligation.

What are the two types of Fraud?

1. Dolo Causante

2. Dolo Incidente

Dolo Causante are those deceptions or misrepresentations of a serious character employed by one party and without which the other party would not have entered into the contract.

Dolo Incidente are those which are not serious in character and without which the other party would still have entered into the contract.

What type of fraud or dolo is contemplated by Article 1171?

The dolo or fraud under Art. 1171 is Dolo Incidente because by seeing the nature of Dolo Causante, it will make the agreement annullable so it is not the one contemplated in Article 1171.

What is the effect of waiver of future fraud in an obligation?

A waiver of an action for future fraud is void (no effect, as if there is no waiver) as being against the law and public policy.

Illustration/Example:

If A bought a car from B worth P50,000 and, after delivery of the car by B, A paid B counterfeit money on due date, A shall be liable for damages. If, in the contract of sale, A and B stipulated that any fraudulent act by another in the performance of his obligation shall not be a ground for the aggrieved party to file a suit against the other for fraud is a void stipulation. By express provision of law, waiver is void.

Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103) 

What is article 1172 about?

It is about the responsibility arising from negligence in an obligation.

What is the meaning of Article 1172?

In the performance of every kind of obligation, the debtor is liable for damages resulting from his negligence.

What is the reason behind this article?

The reason is because negligence is a question which must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. Moreover, negligence is not as serious as fraud because in the case of the former, there is no bad faith or deliberate intention to cause injury.

What is Negligence?

It is lack of foresight or knowledge

What are the kinds of Negligence according to source of obligation?

1. Culpa Contractual

2. Culpa Aquiliana

3. Culpa Criminal

Culpa Contractual

It is where negligence is merely incidental in the performance of an obligation. There is always a pre existing contractual relation. The source of the obligation of the defendant to pay damages is the breach or non-fulfillment of the contract. Proof of the existence of the contract and of its breach or non-fulfillment is sufficient prima facie to warrant recovery.

Culpa Aquiliana

It is where negligence is direct, substantive and independent. There may or may not be a pre-existing contractual obligation. The source of obligation is the defendant’s negligence itself. The negligence of the defendant must be proven. 

Culpa Criminal

The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176.

Illustrations/Examples

Illustration 1

If S entered into a contract of sale with B to deliver a specific horse on a certain day and the horse died through the negligence of S before delivery, S is liable for damages to B for having failed to fulfill a pre-existing obligation (contract may be either express or implied) because of his negligence. This is culpa contractual.

Illustration 2

Assume now, that the horse belongs to and is in the possession of B. The negligence of S which results in the death of the horse is culpa aquiliana. In this case, there is no pre-existing contractual relation between S and B. The negligence itself is the source of liability. 

 

Illustration 3

With the previous illustration, the crime can be committed by negligence. If B wants, he can bring an action for culpa criminal (damage to property through simple or reckless imprudence). Here, the crime is the source of the obligation of S to pay damages. 

What is the rule on the liability for damages of S in the previous illustration?

As a rule, B cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of S. In other words, responsibility for quasi-delict is not demandable together with the civil liability arising from a criminal offense. 

What is the effect of negligence in an obligation as a general rule?

If negligence is present in the obligation, it is likewise demandable.

What is the effect of negligence on the part of the injured party?

Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides that “When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.”

In other words, to be entitled to damages, the law does not require that the negligence of the defendant should be the sole cause of the damage. There is contributory negligence on the part of the injured party where his conduct has contributed, as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. The defense of contributory negligence of the injured party does not apply in criminal cases where the offense was committed by the accused through reckless imprudence since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence. 

What is the effect of waiver of future negligence in an obligation? 

Waiver of future negligence may be allowed except in the following cases:

a. where the nature of the obligation requires exercise of extraordinary diligence as in the case of common carriers and 

b. also where negligence shows bad faith. (Art. 1172)

Illustration/Example

In the case of Philippine National Bank v. CA, the bank negligently dishonored the check of its depositor. The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos. Even without malice and bad faith, the petitioner’s negligence caused anxiety and embarrassment, which entitles her to moral damages wherein damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the defendant’s expense.

Case Digest from Original Case

Citation: 

Chavez v. Gonzales, 32 SCRA 547, June 29, 1957

Case Docket:

G.R. No. L-27454

Plaintiff-Appellant:

Rosendo O. Chaves

Defendant-Appellee:

Fructuoso Gonzales

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant:

Chaves, Elio, Chaves & Associates

Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:

Sulpicio E. Platon

Ponente:

REYES, J.B.L., J.

page 74, Article 1168 of Balane book

Facts:

In the early part of July, 1963, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant, who is a typewriter repairer, a portable typewriter for routine cleaning and servicing. The defendant was not able to finish the job after some time despite repeated reminders made by the plaintiff. The defendant merely gave assurances, but failed to comply with the same. In October, 1963, the defendant asked from the plaintiff the sum of P6.00 for the purchase of spare parts, which amount the plaintiff gave to the defendant. On October 26, 1963, after getting exasperated with the delay of the repair of the typewriter, the plaintiff went to the house of the defendant and asked for the return of the typewriter. 

The defendant delivered the typewriter in a wrapped package. On reaching home, the plaintiff examined the typewriter returned to him by the defendant and found out that the same was in shambles, with the interior cover and some parts and screws missing. On October 29, 1963. the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant formally demanding the return of the missing parts, the interior cover and the sum of P6.00 (Exhibit D). The following day, the defendant returned to the plaintiff some of the missing parts, the interior cover and the P6.00.

Issue:

Whether or not defendant shall be held liable

Ruling:

Yes, the defendant shall be held liable. The defendant-appellee is ordered to pay the plaintiff-appellant the sum of P89.85, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint. Costs in all instances against appellee Fructuoso Gonzales.

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Thank you very much! :)

Article 390, 391 and 392 of Family Code

 CHAPTER 4

Presumption of Death

Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. (n)

-The law lays down the presumption of death of a person after an absence of seven (7) years, provided that it is unknown whether he is still alive or not. 

-The law says that the absent spouse shall be presumed dead for “all purposes” except succession. It is only after an absence of ten (10) years that his succession will be opened. In that case, his heirs can now commence an intestate proceeding, for purposes of dividing or distributing the estate of the absentee, for by then, the right of inheritance shall have already become choate, for under Article 777 if the Civil Code, it is from the moment of death that there  shall be transmission of rights, properties, or even obligations from the decedent to the heirs because of the presumptive death of the absentee. There is no physical death, but there is only presumptive death under the situation.

May a person be declared presumptively dead?

No, as a general rule, because:

a. it would be useless to make such declaration since it is already declared by law

b. the judgment would never really become final, since the person involved may actually turnout to be still alive.

Amplifying further such ruling in Lukban v Republic, the Supreme Court said in Nicolas v. Zsatrow, 46 O.G. 1st Supp. 243, that the philosophy behind the ruling in Lukban v Republic is that a judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only.It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or subject matter involved in case, or upon a competent court has to pass.It is, therefore, clear that judicial declaration tha a person is presumptively dead because he had been unheard fron in seven year, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary to proof, cannot be final.

Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: 

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years; 

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. (n)

The reason why a person is presumed dead under these circumstances provided in Article 391 is the great possibility that the person is dead after four years from the time of the loss of the vessel or other catastrophe.

Rules:

1. The period of four (4) years in Article 391, NCC has been reduced to two (2) years under Article 41 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, but te present spouse has to go to court in summary proceeding for purposes of having the absent spouse declared presumptively dead so that he/she can contract a subsequent marriage. If the present spouse does not go to court for that purpose and contracts a subsequent marriage, the same is void and bigamous. He can be convicted of the crime of bigamy (Manuel v People, GR No. 165842, November 29, 2005; Republic v CA, etal, GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005)

2. Article 391, NCC governs extraordinary absence. From the language of the law, the period of four (4) years shall be reckoned at the beginning of the period pursuant to that decision of the Court of Appeals in Judge Advocate General v Gonzales, etal 48 OG 12, p. 5329.

3. The Supreme Court said that, Article 391, NCC, relating to the presumption of death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage, applies to cases wherein the vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the word “lost” used in referring to a vessel must be given the same meaning as “missing” employed in connection with an aeroplane, the persons taking both means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the same sentence. Where, as in the case at bar, none of the foregoing conditions appear to exist, the rule does not apply. Instead, the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of death. ( Victory Shipping Lines, Inc., WCC, 106 Phil 550; Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. v Baens del Rosario, et al., L-13130, October 31, 1959).

4. If the absentee appear or his presence is proved, he can recover his properties and the price of any properties that may have been alienated or the properties acquired therewith. He cannot, however, claim any fruits or rents.

-The reason is obvious because the possessor is presumed to be in good faith, and if that is so, he is entitled to the fruits of the propertis in his possession.

-Vessels/Aeroplanes- include watercraft and all aircrafts respectively. But the loss of the vessel must be during a sea voyage. This will include not only voyages in the open sea, but also passage along the mouths of rivers, canals in the course of such voyage. However, trips which are only in inland waters are not included (8 Von Tuhr 26).

-Other circumstances where there is danger of death would include such events as earthquakes, fires, explosions, inundations, dangerous expeditions, cave-ins of mines, volcanic eruptions, landslides, etc. 

- It has, however, been said that the more logical view seems to be that the period should be computed from the last day of danger; in case of expeditions and similar adventures of which nothing is heard of after it has started, the date when it should have been computed, if favorably concluded, is to be taken into account. (2 Von Tuhr 27).

Article 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194)

The law provides for the effect of reapperance or proof of existence of the person presumed dead. Let us say that a person was presumed dead and his estate was distributed in accordance with law or his will, but reappears, then, he can recover the properties in the condition they may be found, or the price thereof,if they have been sold or alienated. But he cannot claim the fruits or rents. 

The reason for this is that the distributees and heirs are in good faith. Under Article 544 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is entitled to receive the fruits of the thing in his possession. But the moment he reappears, the possessor would no longer be entitled to receive the fruits, as they would then redound to the benefit of the owner. There would also be interruption of the possession in good faith.

In the Family Code, when the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage after judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, and there is an affidavit of reapperance that is registered by an interested person in the proper civil registry, with notice to the parties of the second marriage, the latter shall be considered as automatically terminated, without prejudice to the right of the present spouse to question such reappearance. 

It is believed that if the absent spouse physically reappears, the subsequent marriage would still be terminated. This is so because of the fact that if constructive reapperance by the way of the registration of the affidavit of reapperance is enough, then with more reason physical reapperance should terminate the subsequent marriage. The added reason is that, in case an affidavit of reapperance is registered, the present spouse can question the fact of reapperance.

Case:

G.R. No. 165842   

Manuel v People of the Philippines

November 29, 2005

Callejo, Sr, J.

Facts:

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.  He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was 'single.

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a 'love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was 'single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy.

Ruling:

Yes,the petitioner is guilty of bigamy.Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaa's presumptive death as the absent spouse. 

The Court also ruled that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. 

Article 237, 238 and 239 of Family Code

 Art. 237. The annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage of a minor or of the recorded agreement mentioned in the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall revive the parental authority over the minor but shall not affect acts and transactions that took place prior to the recording of the final judgment in the Civil Register. (n)

This has been repealed by RA 6809

TITLE XI

SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW

Chapter 1. Scope of Application

Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules  in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (n)

The law makes the provisions of the Rule of Court, applicable in matters of separation in fact of the spouses, abandonment, and incidents pertaining to parental authority.

Chapter2: Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife

Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.

The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n)

Case:

G.R. No. L-10134   

Econde v Capuno

June 29, 1957

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

Facts:

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school’s supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.

It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about P300.00.

Issue:

Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.

Ruling:

Yes, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.